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T irm Patent-Antitrust section of the Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws is an
excellent analysis of the existing law and is an invaluable handbook
for practitioners in this difficult field. The writer's approach to the
problem is different from that of the committee and before comment-
ing specifically on the Report it is only fair to state the writer's views of
the problem lest differences in viewpoint give the impression of criti-
cism of the Report.
In any approach to the patent-antitrust problem there is a basic
question: does a "patent-antitrust problem" exist? The Report of the
Attorney General's Committee indicates that there is such a problem
and that the problem involves many ramifications which are difficult
of solution. The writer believes that there is no such problem.
The patent laws secure to the patent owner the right to exclude
others from making, using or selling the patented invention,1 and the
antitrust laws forbid restraint of trade, monopoly and attempts to
monopolize. Within its proper, lawful scope a patent is a lawful
monopoly; attempts to obtain or to use a patent within its scope are
lawful attempts to monopolize; and the extent to which trade is re-
strained within the scope of a patent is a lawful restraint. So long
as a patent owner stays within his patent grant he has no antitrust
problems and when he goes outside the terms of his grant, he has no
patent protection. The many so-called "patent-antitrust" cases do not
resolve or decide conflicts between the patent laws and the antitrust
laws but rather define the line at which one steps outside the protec-
tion of the patent laws into the prohibitions of the antitrust laws.
A patent is a valuable business asset2 but like any other business
asset, it has its uses and its limitations. A screw driver is invaluable
for driving screws but useless for driving nails. Similarly a patent on
a salt-dispensing machine might be invaluable in securing a monopoly
in the manufacture, use or sale of salt-dispensing machines, but it is
a source of antitrust responsibility, civil, criminal and financial in seek-
ing a monopoly of salt Monopolization by acquiring competitors
* Member, District of Columbia Bar.-Ed.
135 U.S.C. (1952) §154.
2 DIGons Asin Nrrscmm, PA.ENT PRAcnc~s AND Tm Aqnmusr LAws 39-42
(1951).3 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12 (1947); Morton
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 62 S.Ct. 402 (1942).
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is illegaP as is a conspiracy or combination to monopolize.' Similarly,
patents do not justify monopolization by acquisition 6 or combination
or conspiracy.'
Patents realistically evaluated and skillfully handled can be the
cornerstone of a lawful monopoly" while overextension of patents can
lead to triple damage judgments? or criminal convictions."0
Most of the so-called "patent-antitrust" cases illustrate attempts to
use a patent to accomplish a result for which the patent is not adapted.
Thus patents on salt machines were used to monopolize salt,1' a patent
on a refrigerating transportation package was used to monopolize solid
carbon dioxide,'2 a patent on a method for preventing evaporation
from concrete during curing was used to monopolize bituminous
emulsion,' 3 and a patent on a domestic heating system was used to
monopolize switches.' 4 Patents have also been used to enforce re-
strictions after the patented products have passed beyond the patentee's
power to control.'5
The fact that the courts have condemned such practices is not a
condemnation, limitation, or restriction of the patent right and does
not involve conflict between patent law and antitrust law. Rather,
the so-called patent-antitrust decisions merely "render to Caesar the
things that are Caesar's" and keep the two laws each in its proper
sphere.' No difficulty is found when a patent on lamps is used
to monopolize lamps,' 7 a patent on welding flux is used to monopolize
4 United States v. Pullman Co., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 123.
5 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 1125 (1946).
6 United States v. Vehicular Parling, Ltd., (D.C. Del. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 828, 61
U.S.P.Q. 102 at 118 (conclusion of law No. 25).
7 Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 33 S.Ct. 9 (1912);
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 68 S.Ct. 550 (1948).
8 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192 (1926).
9 Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 64 S.Ct.
278 (1944).
10 United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 989 (Carboloy
Case).
11 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12 (1947); Mor-
ton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 495, 62 S.Ct. 402 (1942).
12 Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 51 S.Ct. 334
(1931).
13Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 288 (1938).
14 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 S.Ct. 268
(1944).
15 Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 33 S.Ct. 616 (1913); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v.
United States, 309 U.S. 436, 60 S.Ct. 618 (1940).
16 "Rights conferred by patents are indeed very definite and extensive. . . . The
Sherman Act is a limitation of rights. .. " Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States,
226 U.S. 20 at 49, 33 S.Ct. 9 (1912).
17United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192 (1926).
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welding flux,"8 or a patent on shoe machinery used to monopolize
shoe machinery. 9
It is the assumption that there is conflict between the patent laws
and the antitrust laws which causes the difficulty and confusion. In
the Mercoid case2 ' Justice Douglas believed that the result of that de-
cision was "to limit substantially the doctrine of contributory infringe-
ment." Logically the decision did no such thing.
Misuse depends upon acts and practices of the patentee irrespec-
tive of other considerations. If a patentee is using a patent on one
thing to monopolize or restrain trade in another, he is misusing the
patent no matter what the alleged infringer is doing. In the Mercoid
cases, the patentee's misuse or unclean hands constituted a complete
defense before the Court reached the question whether Mercoid was
or was not a contributory infringer. The question of contributory
infringement never became an issue in the Mercoid cases because no
matter what Mercoid was doing, the patentee by his own conduct
had forfeited his right to relief under the patent laws.
The so-called patent antitrust problem therefore involves nothing
more than a delineation of the extent of the patent right (which is
clearly defined by statute) and if the practice in question is within
the patent right, it is lawful. It is only practices which are outside
or beyond the patent right which violate the antitrust laws.
The basic remedy lies in either securing patents which will ac-
complish the desired result2' or, if this cannot be done or if patents
are already issued, in evaluating the scope of the patents realistically
and utilizing them within their proper, lawful scope. The plan of
exploitation should be tailored to fit the patent, and it is the Pro-
crustean approach of fitting the patent to a plan which causes the
trouble.
The patent laws implement the constitutional objective of pro-
moting the progress of science and the useful arts. When patent
rights are distorted, or exceeded or expanded, the result weakens the
patent laws and brings the patent system into disrepute. Strict ad-
herence to the patent laws will strengthen the system and simulta-
neously avoid antitrust problems.
18 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 69 S.Ct. 535
(1949), rehearing 339 U.S. 605, 70 S.Ct. 854 (1950).
19 Wiiamns Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 316 U.S. 364, 62 S.Ct. 1179
(1942).
20 320 U.S. 661 at 669, 64 S.Ct. 268 (1944).
2 1 Cases cited in notes 17, 18, and 19 supra.
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A patent defines the invention which it covers with particularity
and distinctness 22 so that the patentee, licensees, competitors and the
public may know with certainty what the patent covers. Within
that coverage, whether it be broad or narrow, the patentee has a mon-
,opoly protected by law. The patentee who wishes to extend his patent
today may well be the victim of an extension by his competitor to-
morrow;23 the patentee in one case is the infringer in the next.
Whether the monopoly of a patent be large or small, any.permitted
extension of that monopoly casts all who are concerned with patents
into a sea of doubt and uncertainty. The so-called patent-antitrust
cases not only involve antitrust violations but strike at the integrity of
the patent system.
Tr COMwrTEE REPORT
The Report explains the patent-antitrust topic in logical, orderly
fashion beginning with a brief discussion of the nature of the patent
right and continuing through acquisition, nonuse, individual license
limitations, multiple license limitations, cross licenses, pools or inter-
changes, infringement suits, the misuse defense and remedies.
The introductory discussion of the nature of the patent right brings
out the fact that a patent gives its owner the right to* exclude others
from making, using, or selling the invention defined in the patent
claims but it does not point out that this is the only right a patent gives.
The patent right is a naked right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the invention2 4 and does not even give
its owner the positive right to practice the invention. 5 Most other
forms of property include the right to use and enjoy as well as the
right to exclude others from use and enjoyment so that while a patent
may have "the attributes of personal property,"'2 it does not have all
of the attributes of the more familiar forms of property, and the legal
concepts which are applicable to property where ownership includes
both the right to use and the right to exclude do not necessarily apply
to patents where ownership consists of a mere right to exclude. Thus,
2235 U.S.C. (1952) §112.
23 In United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 989,
General Electric was a party to a combination of patentees, and in United States v. Line
Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 68 S.Ct. 550 (1948), General Electric was in effect a victim
of a similar combination.
2435 U.S.C. (1952) §154.
25"A patent is property carried to the highest degree of abstraction-a right .... to
exclude, without a physical object or content." 1 HoLas-PoLLocK LEauns 53 (1941),
quoted by Justice Jackson in the Mercoid case, 320 U.S. 661 at 678, 64 S.Ct. 268 (1944).
See also Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501 (1878).
26 35 U.S.C. (1952) §261.
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a license is not a transfer of "less than the whole of the patent right, 27
since ordinarily a license does not give the licensee any part of that right
to exclude.28  The usual license merely frees the licensee from the
patentee's right to exclude. The distinction is important in consider-
ing compulsory licensing.
The Report states:
Virtually all of the patent-antitrust matters we consider stem
from the impact of the antitrust laws upon the utilization and
transfer of patent rights which in their inception fall squarely
within the patent law." (p. 225)
Most of the decided cases do not involve utilization and transfer
of patent rights which in their inception fall squarely within the
patent law but rather involve excursions outside or beyond the metes
and bounds of patent coverage. Restrictions which apply after the
patent right has been exhausted29 or restrictions beyond the patent
scope have been condemned, 0 but where a particular practice or re-




"... violation of the Sherman Act should, as the cases suggest,
require abuse of the patent grant or proof of intent to monopolize
beyond the lawful patent grants." (p. 226)
This conclusion relates to utilization of patent rights rather than
acquisition. It is difficult to see how acquisition of patents by grant
could violate the antitrust laws even if a patent monopoly were de-
2 7 
RPoiR or TH ATroENEY GENERAL's NATIONAL CoMMTrTEE To STu Tu
ANnrsmusT LAws, March 31, 1955, p. 225 (hereinafter cited REPORT, followed by the
page number). Page numbers in the text refer to the Report.
28 "A licensee has no property in the patent. He possesses no interest in the franchise.
His rights touch only the invention, and do not affect the monopoly of the patent, other-
wise than by estopping the licensor from exercising its prohibitory powers in derogation
of the privileges conferred by the license. ROniNSON ON PATENTS, §763,806. They con-
stitute but a mere exemption from suit for acts done within the scope of the license."
Moto Meter Co. v. National Gauge & Equipment Co., (D.C. Del. 1929) 31 F. (2d)
994 at 996.29 Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 33 S.Ct. 616 (1913); Adams v. Burke, 17 Wall.
(84 U.S.) 453 (1873); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 60 S.Ct.
618 (1940).
30 Mercoid v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 S.Ct. 268 (1944).
81United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192 (1926);
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 58 S.Ct. 849
(1938), 305 U.S. 124, 59 S.Ct. 116 (1938). See also Hartford-Empire Co. v. United
States, 323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1945) on "blocking off" and "fencing in."
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liberately and intentionally acquired, and the Hartford-Empire de-
cision" makes immaterial the purpose and intent in securing a patent
by grant.
2. By Purchase
"Impropriety [in the acquisition of patents by purchase] will
arise only where such acquisition is part of an illegal purpose or
plan." (p. 227)
The Report then gives the following points to be considered:
"(a) the nature, number and value of the patents acquired, in re-
lation to the market for competing patented or unpatented processes
or products; (b) whether the inventor is using the patent, or has the
ability and plans to use it, as against evidence of the purchaser's actual
or intended use; (c) whether the purchase has the purpose and prob-
able effect of resolving patent conflict; (d) the purpose and effect of
• . . the increase or decrease in competition in the relevant geographic
and product market." (p. 227)
One further consideration should be added to this list. Acquisi-
tion by purchase is also improper if it has an illegal result, monopoly.33
Perhaps this is implicit in (a), 34 but even though the purchaser's im-
mediate intent may be to resolve patent conflicts or to free himself
from risk of infringement, the acquisition would probably be illegal
if monopoly in fact is the result,35 and a purpose or intent to monopo-
lize is present if the acquisition of monopoly power comes about as a
consequence of business conduct or arrangement.3
3. By Grant Back
"... in determining the legality of grant backs, their purpose
and effect is relevant; more particularly, what is their effect on
(1) the licensor's position as to, patents or the products they
cover, and (2) each party's incentive to research." (p. 229)
Again it would seem that a further point should be added. Grant
backs may also affect a licensee's competitive position vis-a-vis other
licensees especially where the grant back includes the right to sub-
license. In a situation such as that in the General Electric Lamp
3 2 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1945).
33 United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., (D.C. Del. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 828,
61 U.S.P.Q. 102 at 118 (conclusion of law No. 25).34 See REPoRT 227, n. 21.
35 In United States v. Pullman Co., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 123, the court held
a monopoly illegal even though acquired without illegal practices, and in United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416, the court held that
anticipating increases in demand and providing capacity to meet the increase violated
§2 of the Sherman Act.
8 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333.
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Case3' 7 the grant back of a license to General Electric by a small
licensee such as Chicago Miniature Lamp Company and the exten-
sion of that license to a larger licensee such as Westinghouse may ad-
versely affect the competitive position of Chicago Miniature with re-
spect to Westinghouse independently of other effects.
B. Nonuse of Patented Inventions
"We believe that an improper purpose unduly to restrain
trade, to monopolize or attempt to monopolize through individual
nonuse should give rise to antitrust liability. On the other hand
where there is no affirmative showing that the purpose or effect
of nonuse is unreasonably to restrain trade, to monopolize or
attempt to monopolize, the patentee's conduct does not trans-
gress the antitrust laws. Clearly, however, contracts, combination
or conspiracy among patentees to refrain from using or to refuse
to license others to use patented inventions should be deemed
unreasonable Ver se." (p. 231)
This is an accurate statement of the existing law. The patent
statute sets the conditions for the grant of a patent and so long as those
conditions are met and fulfilled, the patentee is, absent a conspiracy,
free to use or not use the invention as he sees fit.3 However, the courts
are inclined to be strict with unused patents (paper patents),39 and
even if there is no purpose to restrain trade or monopolize, nonuse of
a patent having a public interest may render the patent unenforceable
in certain cases °
C. Patent Licenses
1. Individual License Limitations
a. Price
'We think, however, that in the absence of horizontal agree-
ment among licensees, or any plan aimed at or resulting in in-
dustry-wide price fixing, licenses with price fixing provisions
fall within the orbit of the patent and need not run afoul of the
antitrust laws." (p. 235)
This particular recommendation is inconsistent with the recom-
mendation that the Miller-Tydings and McGuire amendments be
37 United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 753.
8 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 at 432, 65 S.Ct., 373 (1945);
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 28 S.Ct. 748 (1908).
See also Frost, "Legal Incidents of Non-Use of Patented Inventions Reconsidered," 14
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 273, 435 (1946).
39 Cocks v. Rip Van Winkle Wall Bed Co., (9th Cir. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 921.
40 Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, (9th Cir.
1944, 1945) 146 F. (2d) 941, cert. den. 325 U.S. 876, 65 S.Ct. 1554 (1945).
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repealed.41 The Miller-Tydings and McGuire amendments permit
only vertical price fixing on commodities "in free and open competi-
tion with commodities of the same general class produced by others"
and horizontal price fixing between competitors is expressly prohibited.
When goods are not competitive in fact, even vertical price fixing is
illegal. 2
Price fixing under the General Electric decision is necessarily
horizontal price fixing and in that case General Electric and Westing-
house together manufactured and sold 85 percent of all "modem
electric lights. '43  Thus the committee recommends repeal of statutes
which prohibit all horizontal price fixing and would not permit even
vertical price fixing of color film of a single manufacturer but recom-
mends that horizontal price fixing involving manufacturers of 85 per-
cent of all electric lamps be permitted.
The General Electric doctrine has been so limited to the specific
facts stated in the Supreme Court's opinion 44 that the very patents
involved in the General Electric case would not support price fixing
today and probably would not have supported price fixing when that
case was decided had the patents been analyzed for the Supreme
Court."
The General Electric case was decided on the basis of three patents
which, the Supreme Court stated, "cover completely the making of the
modem electric lights with the tungsten filaments . -. .,4 In fact,
two of the patents did not cover the lamp at all: one patent covered
only a filament and the other had valid claims only to a process for
making a filament.47  These patents would not justify fixing the price
of the lamp.4
4 1 REpORT 154.
42 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (2d Cir. 1946) 158 F. (2d) 592,
cert. den. 330 U.S. 828, 67 S.Ct 869 (1947).
4 3 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 at 481, 47 S.Ct. 192 (1926).
44 United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., (D.C. Del. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 828 at
838, n. 14.
45The General Electric case was tried on stipulated facts. United States v. General
Electric Co., (D.C. Ohio 1925) 15 F. (2d) 715 at 716.
40 272 U.S. 476 at 481, 47 S.Ct. 192 (1927).
4 l7Just and Hanaman patent No. 1,018,502 claims only a filament, and product claims
of Coolidge patent No. 1,082,933 were held invalid [General Electric Co. v. DeForest
Radio Co., (3d Cir. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 6411 leaving only claims to a method of making the
filament. Most of the product claims of patent No. 1,082,933 were disclaimed January 25,
1929, a little less than two years before the patent expired. Since the tungsten filament
lamp involved only the substitution of a tungsten filament for the carbon filament in the
original Edison lamp (patent No. 223,898), the invention was in the filament and not in
the lamp. Bassick Mfg. Co. v. R. M. Hollingshead Co., 298 U.S. 415, 56 S.Ct. 787
(1936).
4 8 PRpoRT 234, n. 47 reads as follows: "Barbor Colman Co. v. National Tool Co., 136
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The third patent in the General Electric case highlights Louis B.
Schwartz' dissent to the recommendation. That patent, No. 1,180,159,
is for a combination which includes all of the elements of prior lamps,
a bulb, base, filament, lead-in wires, stem, etc., plus an unpatented inert
gas in the bulb. Under that patent, prices could not be fixed on a vacu-
um lamp but could be fixed on a lamp where the only change is sub-
stitution of an inert gas for the vacuum. Whether the Supreme Court
appreciated and intended this result in 1926 is open to serious doubt
and it is almost certain that the present Supreme Court would not
approve price fixing under such circumstances.
The recommendation apparently contemplates multiple as well as
single licenses and approves price fixing by a patentee "in the absence
of horizontal agreement among licensees" but in discussing the fair
trade laws, the Report recognized that "vertical" resale-price agree-
ments between a seller and several distributors actually restrain com-
petition among the distributors and extinguishes price competition on
that level as effectively as any "horizontal" price fixing agreement.4 9
Fixing the price of a plurality of patent licensees would effect hori-
zontal price fixing between licensees in the same way as the vertical
price fixing in the Dr. Miles case ° or under the fair trade laws."
The General Electric case holds that price fixing is "normally and
reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's
monopoly" and on this premise it is difficult to see why the doctrine
should be restricted to product patents.52 The owner of a patent on
a process or machine for producing an old article in a more efficient
and less expensive way might well wish to reap his "pecuniary reward"
by producing and selling the article. 3 If reward is the test, there is
no apparent reason for limiting the power to fix prices to one single
F. (2d) 339 (6th Cir. 1943) (machine patent and process patent do not justify fixing
the sales price of unpatented products of the machine and process); Cummer-Graham Co. v.
Straight Side Basket Corp., 142 F. (2d) 646 (5th Cir. 1944); American Equip. Co. v.
Tuthill Bld'g. Mat'l. Co., 69 F. (2d) 406 (7th Cir. 1934) (patentee cannot fix price of
unpatented bricks produced with patented brick handling machine). But see Straight Side
Basket Corp. v .Webster Basket Co., 82 F. (2d) 245 (2d Cir. 1936) (patentee may fix sales
price of unpatented product of patented machine). See also United States v. General Elec-
trio Co. (Carboloy), 80 F. Supp. 989, 1004 (S.D. N.Y. 1948), but see General Electric
Co. v. Willey's Carbide Tool Co., 33 F. Supp. 969 (E.D. Mich, 1940)."
4 9 REPoRT 150.
50 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376
(1911).
51 But see Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Bulldog Electric Products Co., (4th Cir.
1950) 179 F. (2d) 139.
52 272 U.S. 476 at 490. See note 48 supra.
53 For example, patent No. 988,230 covers a process for producing synthetic sapphires.
If the patentee wished to reap his reward by making and selling sapphires why should he
not be allowed to fix his licensee's price?
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type of patent when the patent statute makes no distinction between
patents."
Without considering the public policy issues involved in granting
a patentee the right to fix prices, the doctrine of the General Electric
case seems practically unworkable as limited by the courts. So un-
workable is the doctrine that the Supreme Court has never upheld
price fixing in a single case where the full facts were before it.55
Whatever the law should be as a matter of policy, the fact is that the
General Electric doctrine is, as stated by one writer, "most noteworthy
for its lack of vitality."5  The doctrine should be made intelligible
and workable or dropped.
b. Field of Use, Quantity and Territorial Limitations
"A patentee may license the manufacture or use of the
patented invention only within a certain field, or for a fixed
quantity of manufacture or use, or within a fixed territory."
(p. 236)
The discussion in support of this proposition is an accurate analysis
of existing case law. Even though, as Mr. Schwartz maintains, such
limitations have been criticized, the proposition is in accord with the
decided cases and Congress has not seen fit to change the law.
The final conclusion reached by the committee in this section
-that a patent will not support an agreement by the licensee not to
export-fails to distinguish between a license limitation and an agree-
ment. Bearing in mind that a license is merely a release or waiver
or exemption of the patent owner's right to exclude 7 that release,
waiver or exemption may be as broad or narrow as the patent owner
chooses to make it. Acts of the licensee beyond the license fall within
the patent owner's right to exclude, and the patentee's remedy is an
infringement suit. If the restriction on the licensee is a contract re-
5 4 In the statute [35 U.S.C. (1952) §101], process, machine, manufacture, composi-
tion of matter and improvement are treated equally.
55 The Supreme Court has upheld price fixing in two cases: Bement v. National Har-
row Co., 186 U.S. 70, 22 S.Ct. 747 (1902), and United States v. General Electric, 272
U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192 (1926). In Bement, only one of a group of licenses was before
the Court and the National Harrow practices were held illegal in National Harrow v.
Hench, (C.C. Pa. 1896) 76 F. 667, affd. (3d Cir. 1897) 83 F. 36. National Harrow Co.
v. Quick, (C.C. Ind. 1895) 67 F. 130. See Meyers and Lewis, 'The Patent 'Franchise'
and the Antitrust Laws," 30 Gao. L. J. 117 at 134 (1941); Barnard and Zlinkoff, "Patents,
Procedure and the Sherman Act," 17 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 1 at 34, n. 135 (1948). In
the General Electric case, the full patent story (see note 23 supra) was not before the
Court.56 Wood and Johnson, "Patents and the Antitrust Laws," 1950 UNIv. ILL. LAw
FoRum 544 at 562.
57 See note 28 supra.
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striction enforceable by a breach of contract action, the question
ceases to be a patent question. Logically, it would seem that a re-
strictive "agreement" should be tested by the antitrust laws rather than
the patent laws.
c. Tying Clauses
"... where the tying product is patented, the patentee should
be permitted to show that in the entire factual setting, including
the scope of the patent in relation to the other patented or un-
patented products, the patent does not create the market power
requisite to illegality of the tying clause." (p. 238)
The committee's statement that "a tying clause in a patent license
is like a tying clause in any other contract" overlooks economic and
business realities. Inherent in a patent is the right to sue for in-
fringement and this potent factor for establishing and maintaining
tying arrangements is not present in non-patent cases. Where un-
patented products are involved, the purchaser may normally secure
his requirements from other competitive sources" with perhaps little
more than inconvenience or disruption of purchasing habits. When
a patent is involved, disregard of a tying restriction also involves in-
fringement which can mean long, expensive, uncertain litigation"
which only the brave or affluent dare to risk. Patent litigation is
notoriously and inevitably expensive° and the mere possibility of an
infringement suit may be enough to maintain tying arrangements
even though based upon narrow and unimportant patents. As one
author has said, "It would not be good business for them to buy $500
worth of materials and then get tangled up in a $20,000 lawsuit be-
cause they are using those materials.""1
The cornerstone of the patent law is the particularity and distinct-
ness of the patent coverage6 2 and this recommendation suggests that
the patentee be permitted to exceed the bounds of his patent so long
as he does not transgress criteria fixed by other laws. This would
58 Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 69 S.Ct. 1051 (1949).
59 Mid-Continent Investment Co. sued a Mercoid customer for infringement in 1935
[Mid-Continent Investment Co. v. Smith, (D.C. Mo. 1937) 35 U.S.P.Q. 204] and it re-
quired nearly nine years of litigation to have the Mid-Continent Investment Co. practices
declared illegal [Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 S.Ct.
268 (1944)] after the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had held the practices
legal [(7th Cir. 1942) 133 F. (2d) 803].
60 1t is not uncommon for the defense of an infringement suit to cost $20,000 to
$50,000. Haynes, "Management Looks at Patents," 37 J. PAT. OFE. Soc. 140 at 144
(1955).
61 Id. at 144.
6235 U.S.C. (1952) §112.
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destroy the integrity of the patent system since one could no longer
determine patent scope from the patent itself but would be forced to
determine patent scope from such vague, uncertain factors as "relation
to other patented and unpatented products" and "market power." This
uncertainty would affect patentees, licensees, competitors and the pub-
lic alike and the legality of a tying practice would never be finally
settled since such considerations as the relationship with other pro-
ducts and market power can vary with changing conditions.
d. Restrictions on the Patentee
"Contractual restrictions limiting the patentee's own freedom
of action, on the other hand, are clearly beyond the scope of any
patent protection and must be evaluated under antitrust standards.
Some such restrictions may be proper as reasonably ancillary to
the rights the patentee has conveyed." (p. 238)
This proposition accurately states the existing case law but even
ancillary restrictions on the patentee must be carefully scrutinized.
Ancillary covenants not to compete are common in connection with
the sale of other property63 but a similar covenant in a patent transfer
is ineffective if the transferor shows that he is practicing the prior art.64
e. Package Licensing
"Package licensing should be prohibited only where there is
refusal, after a request, to license less than a complete package.
Additionally, the licensor should not be required to justify on
any proportional basis the royalty rate for less than the complete
package, so long as the rate set is not so disproportionate as to
amount to a refusal to license less than the complete package."
(pp. 239-240)
The problem of package licensing is undoubtedly difficult to solve
in a manner which is practical and does not involve an unlawful tying
situation. In a group of patents, each of several, standing alone,
might justify a particular royalty rate, one percent, for example. On
the other hand, the product covered by the patents may be such that
it cannot carry a total royalty in excess of three percent, for example,
regardless of the number of patents involved.
A situation of this type arose in the Vehicular Parking case. 5 There
it was charged that an intervenor's parking meter infringed each of
63 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., (6th Cir. 1898) 85 F. 271, affd.
175 U.S. 211, 20 S.Ct. 96 (1899).
64 Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 66 S.Ct. 101 (1945).
65 (D.C. Del. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 828.
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four patents and. the matter was referred to a master to determine a
reasonable royalty. In an unreported decision, the master ruled that
all four patents were infringed and that a reasonable royalty would be
one percent for each patent up to a total of three percent. While this
ruling struck a balance between the value of each patent individually
and a reasonable royalty for the product, its effect would also be to
coerce the intervenor into taking a license under all four patents despite
differences in expiration dates since the only alternative would be to
face an infringement suit with only the issue of validity left open.
The Report also concludes:
"Moreover, where several 'per piece' licenses are requested and
offered, the mere fact that the sum of the 'per piece' license
royalties exceeds the package royalty rate should not of itself be con-
sidered a condition that all or no patents be taken, again, so long
as the 'per piece' rate is not so disproportionate as to amount to a
refusal to license less than the complete package." (p. 240)
This practice would constitute a strong inducement to take the
license on the entire package and unless there was a substantial eco-
nomic advantage in "the exclusion of products-from the royalty
computation," the licensee would ordinarily take the package. It is
difficult to see any basis upon which to justify charging a greater
royalty for less than the whole package than is charged for the entire
package.
The possible effect of discouraging the production of products
covered by doubtful or invalid patents is another factor to be consid-
ered with this recommendation. As in the case of tying contracts, the
cost of patent litigation is a coercive factor.66 By keeping the royalty
increment on doubtful patents at a low level, the owner of a group of
patents can minimize the danger of a challenge to the doubtful patents.
Who would risk $20,000 to $50,000 on an uncertain lawsuit to avoid
paying $2,000 or $3,000 per year for immunity?
f. Restrictions on Purchasers
"Our starting point is the general rule that the first authorized
sale of a patented article 'exhausts' the patent monopoly. To the
extent this means that the patent cannot justify further restric-
tions on the use of the article, we consider this doctrine sound."
(p. 240)
Apparently this proposition received unanimous approval and is
an accurate statement of existing law.




"In general, a patent license, valid when standing alone, does
not become invalid because other licenses are granted. Illegality
would attach only through a finding equivalent to a conspiracy
among the licensees." (p. 241)
The multiple licensee problem presents serious difficulties when
the licenses contain restriction on price, quantity, territory or field of
use. The General Electric6 7 and General Talking Pictures6" doctrines
involved reward to the patentee and the Ethyl69 and Interstate Circuit0
decisions held that restrictions for the protection of the licensee are
illegal. A price limitation in a single license (as in the Bement and Gen-
eral Electric cases) 1 protects only the patentee and leaves the patentee
free to vary prices as he chooses. On the other hand, price restric-
tions in two or more licenses not only protect the patentee but also
protect each licensee from price competition by every other licensee."'
The same problems are involved to a greater or lesser degree when
limitations on use, quantity or territory are imposed.
The committee suggests that the test of legality be the presence or
absence of a conspiracy or its "equivalent" among licensees, and the
discussion of the Dr. Miles case'3 on page 150 of the Report indicates
that horizontal price uniformity between licensees resulting from in-
dividual agreements with a patentee would have the effect and there-
fore be the "equivalent" of a conspiracy among licensees. The test is
whether restrictions in multiple licenses "deter competition between
rivals in the exploitation of their licenses." 4
3. Cross License Agreements
"Under a cross-licensing agreement, all or part of the consider-
ation for licensing one patent is a license back under another. By
itself, such an agreement entails no antitrust problems. How-
6 7 U nited States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192 (1926).
68 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 58 S.Ct.
849 (1938), 305 U.S. 124, 59 S.Ct. 116 (1938).69 Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 60 S.Ct. 618 (1940).
7 0 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 59 S.Ct 467 (1939).
7
1 Note 55 supra.
72 But see Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Bulldog Electric Products Co., (4th Cir.
1950) 179 F. (2d) 139; United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525
(1948), and discussion in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 at 134,
68 S.Ct. 915 (1948). See also Barnard and Zlinkoff, "Patents, Procedure and the Sherman
Act," 17 Gao. WAsH. L. Rv. 1 at 53 (1948).
73Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parti & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376
(1911).
74 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 at 144, 68 S.Ct. 915
(1948).
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ever, it may encounter antitrust difficulties, either because of an
illegal license restriction or some element of illegal horizontal
agreement beyond the patent license." (p. 242)
The Report discusses the Line Material case7h and suggests that
the test for illegality in a cross license is the existence of horizontal
restriction (e.g., price fixing). Considered strictly as a cross license,
this is undoubtedly the major test.7 However, a cross license and a
grant back are indistinguishable so far as patent rights are concerned
and the tests to be applied with respect to grant backs77 should also
be applied to cross licenses.
4. Interchange of Patent Rights
a patent interchange may be essential to feasible patent
utilization or, in contrast, facilitate undue competitive restraint.
In any given case, a determination of legality requires an ex-
amination of the purpose of the interchange, the power possessed
by the interchange when formed, and its operating practices.
Depending upon the situation, some of these factors, or even one
of them, may be decisive. In other instances, all demand con-
sideration. In all instances, the sound resolution of the antitrust
status of the interchange demands recognition, on the one hand,
of the necessity of the interchange to resolve patent problems and,
on the other, of the opportunity it may bring to engage in anti-
competitive conduct." (pp. 246-247)
The Report also makes the further qualification:
"All members agree, however, that where . . .monopoly re-
sults, a pool should be required to license all applicants without
discrimination and at reasonable royalties. This requirement is
essential to avoid placing non-participants at a cost disadvantage
and further enhancing the market position of the participants.
Even when monopoly is absent, however, licenses should be made
available to every applicant in the industry where the participants
in the interchange give up their independent discretion to license
under the interchanged patents." (pp. 245-246)
Even as qualified, there was a sharp dissent, which suggests that
parties litigate their rights to a conclusion rather than compromise con-
flicts by pooling. However, if patentees were forced in all cases to
litigate their rights, the final results would often come too late to have
75 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 68 S.Ct. 550 (1948).
76 But see Wood, 'Patent Combinations and the Anti-Trust Laws," 17 G~o. WAsHa.
L. R v. 59 at 76 (1948), in which the author suggests that a cross license between two
large companies may be illegal per se.
77 See p. 1098 supra.
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any effect on competition, especially competition from small com-
petitors. In the case of one important patent, the issue of validity
was not finally resolved until thirty days before the patent expired.78
In a situation such as the Cracking Patents case 79 it is unlikely that
any small producer would venture into the field until the giants had
resolved their conflicts, and if some abuses may result from resolution
of conflicts by interchange, the advantages of prompt and
general utilization of the technology probably outweighs the dangers
of abuse so long as there is a way to detect and remedy abuses. It is
probably illegal to impose any restrictions as to price, quantity, terri-
tory or field of use under pooled patents"' and general, unrestricted,
licensing at reasonable royalties is probably the only safe course."'
5. Infringement Suits
Under this heading, the Report treats two distinct topics: (1)
antitrust violation resulting from the bringing of an infringement suit
with an illegal purpose or as part of an illegal plan and (2) antitrust
violation or misuse as a defense. For convenience, these two aspects
of infringement suits will be treated separately.
Misuse of Infringement Suits
"One or numerous infringement suits, by themselves, consti-
tute no antitrust violation. Infringement suits may, on the other
hand, play a part in an overall plan to unduly restrain or monopo-
lize commerce. Threats of suit under a group of narrow and
weak patents may be potent to harass and deter competition."
(pp. 247-248)
a. Where it is shown that an infringement suit has, in fact,
been brought as an integral part of an agreement or plan to vio-
late the antitrust laws and that the defendant sustain resulting
damages, treble damages for antitrust violation should be recov-
erable, whether or not there was a colorable claim of infringe-
ment." (p. 248)
Infringement litigation and threats of litigation can be a powerful
weapon in suppressing competition and competitors.8 " On the other
hand, since patents are not self-enforcing, a patent may be considered
78 Bassick Mfg. Co. v. R. M. Hollingshead Co., 298 U.S. 415, 58 S.Ct. 787 (1936).
79 Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 51 S.Ct. 421 (1931).
80 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 68 S.Ct. 550 (1948).
81 Wood, "Patent Combinations and the Anti-Trust Laws," 17 Gpo. WAsH. L. lrv. 59
at 81 (1948). See also Wood and Johnson, "Patents and the Antitrust Laws," 1950 UN-v.
ILL. LAw FoRuM 544 at 573.
82 Notes 60 and 61 supra.
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as merely a right to bring suit. A patentee is entitled to free access
to the courts and since the outcome of any litigation is uncertain, and
the outcome of patent litigation especially so, 8 a holding of invalidity
or noninfringement does not and should not, in and of itself, subject
the patentee to antitrust or other liability. 4
The recommendation draws a line between the patentee's right to
litigate and patent litigation as an instrument of monopolization or re-
straint of trade. Such a line is difficult if not impossible to draw with
precision even though the presence or absence of a monopolistic pur-
pose or intent may be clear in a particular case. The committee
recommends that a patentee should incur antitrust liability when, and
only when, an infringement suit is an "integral part" of an illegal plan.
The difficulty in applying the recommendation will lie in determining
whether a particular suit is an "integral part" of the illegal plan, but
from the discussion it is apparent that the recommendation is a state-
ment of the ruling in Kobe v. Dempsey 5 and not a proposal of new
and uncertain tests.
Misuse of the Misuse Defense
"b. On the other hand, there may be misuse of the defense
of antitrust violation as, for example, where the defense is in
bad faith and for the purpose of frustrating the patentee's right
to relief. This is basically a problem of judicial control. We
therefore recommend that the courts should make full use of their
powers to curb such attempts to defeat justice. Useful methods
include pretrial procedures to ascertain whether a good faith anti-
trust defense is presented. Similarly, the court might give weight
8SPiplin patent No. 1,687,510 for the inside frost lamp bulb had an unusually
checkered career. It was held invalid in the District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio [(D.C. Ohio 1934) 20 U.S. P.Q. 199] and that holding was reversed on appeal
[General Electric Co. v. Save Sales Co., (6th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 1001. In the Sec-
ond Circuit, it was held invalid by the district court [General Electric Co. v. Wabash
Appliance Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 887] and that holding was also reversed
on appeal [(2d Cir. 1938) 93 F. (2d) 671]. Later, in a contempt proceeding, the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York gave the patent a limited interpretation
[(D.C. N.Y. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 1003]. In the Third Circuit, the district court again held
the patent invalid [General Electric Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co. (D.C. N.J. 1942)
47 F. Supp. 818] and this time the court of appeals afimed [(3d Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d)
414]. Validity was finally set to rest when the Supreme Court held the patent invalid
[General Electric Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242, 66 S.Ct. 81
(1945)]. Validity was settled more than 11 years after the district court decision in the
Save case and three months before the patent expired.
84 Threats of infringement litigation constitute actionable unfair competition [Emack
v. Kane, (C.C. M11. 888) 34 F. 46; Kaplan v. Helenhart Novelty Corp., (2d Cir. 1950)
182 F. (2d) 311] but even oppressive litigation has been held to be within the patentee's
right to sue. See discussion of Eisler litigation in United States v. General Electric Co.,
(D.C. N.J. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 753 at 777-778.
s5 Kobe v. Dempsey Pump Co., C10th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (24) 416, cert. den. 344
U.S. 837, 73 S.Ct. 46 (1952).
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to the bona fides of the defense or counterclaim in exercising
power to award costs or damages and attorneys' fees to the
patentee." (pp. 248-249)
.... we believe that antitrust violation should be considered
a defense to a patent infringement action only when it is shown
that the patent in suit is integral to the violation and that the
grant of customary patent relief conflicts with antitrust goals.
Further, in any patent infringement suit in which antitrust vio-
lation is the basis of defense, or counterclaims, the court, pursu-
ant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, should
order separate trials of the antitrust issues and the patent issues.
Such separation may be essential not only 'in furtherance of con-
venience and to avoid prejudice,' but also 'to serve the ends of
justice.' Trial of the infringement issue should precede trial of
antitrust questions except where, in court discretion, a balancing
of all factors favors prior trial of antitrust issues." (p. 249)
Like the patentee's right to sue, an alleged infringer's right to
present his defenses should be protected, but the misuse defense can
also probably be abused. The committee recommendation regarding
defenses refers to the misuse defense and also to antitrust violation as
a defense and it is not clear that the recommendation is referring to a
single defense. 6
It is also not clear whether the recommendation is proposing a new
and stricter test for the "antitrust ' defense to replace the body of law
which has built up in the misuse cases. Applied literally, the lan-
guage of the proposal would seem to require proof of an antitrust
violation and proof that the patent was an "integral part" of the viola-
tion to make out an antitrust defense. In the development of the
misuse doctrine, the courts speak of "the attempt to use the patent
unreasonably to restrain commerce. '' s Since the later cases hold that
patent misuse is a per se antitrust violation, 8 the proof of misuse is
necessarily proof of an antitrust violation of which the patent is an
integral part.
86 In the earlier cases, the Supreme Court held misuse a defense and found it "un-
necessary to decide whether respondent has violated the Clayton Act. . ." [Morton Salt v.
G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 at 494, 62 S.Ct. 402 (1942)] implying that misuse
short of an antitrust violation would be a defense. However, since Mercoid Corp. v.
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 64 S.Ct. 278 (1944), and Inter-
national Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12 (1947), which held
patent misuse to be a per se violation of the antitrust laws, the distinction is academic.
See Lockhart, "Violation of the Anti-trust Laws as a Defense in Civil Actions," 31 Mnw.
L. REv. 508 at 550 (1947).87 Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 at 34, n. 4,
51 S.Ct. 334 (1931).
88 See note 86 supra.
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The procedural recommendations of separate trials for the patent
and the antitrust issues with the patent issues tried first seems to be
unwarranted interference with judicial discretion. Where the misuse
involves tying, the additional proof required to show plaintiff's prac-
tices" would in many cases be relatively short so that infringement,
validity and misuse could be easily and conveniently determined in a
single trial. Often in proving damages or commercial success, the
facts from which misuse would follow (plaintiff's sales practices) are
placed in evidence in connection with the infringement and validity
issues.
In cases where the patent derives its potency from the cost of in-
fringement litigation, trial of the patent issues first, especially where a
number of patents are involved, might accomplish the very result
which the misuse defense seeks to nullify.
6. The Patent Misuse Doctrine
a. Scope
The committee endorses and approves the doctrine enunciated in
the misuse cases90 and then states:
"We believe, however, that the doctrine should extend only
to those cases where a realistic analysis shows that the patent
itself significantly contributes to the practice under attack."
(p. 251)
Again the question of the hazards and expense of patent litigation
is an important factor which is almost impossible to evaluate in ad-
vance. However, if a patent is involved at all in a particular practice,
the potential victim of the practice must balance the expense and un-
certainty of litigation against the possible cost or disadvantage of ac-
cepting and conforming to the practice.
8 9 The crucial point in the misuse cases seems to be plaintiff's effort to reap his profit
from something outside the patent such as unpatented products or supplies. The follow-
ing statements are typical: "The sole business of the Dry Ice Corporation is the manu-
facture of solid carbon dioxide which it sells under the name of 'DryIce.' It does not make
or sell the patented transportation packages in which solid carbon dioxide is used as a
refrigerant. It does not issue to other concerns licenses to make such packages upon pay-
ment of a stipulated royalty. It does not formally license buyers of its dry ice to use the
invention in suit." Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S.
27 at 29-30, 51 S.Ct. 334 (1931). "The principal business of respondent's subsidiary,
from which its profits are derived, is the sale of salt tablets." Morton Salt Co. v. G. S.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 at 491, 62 S.Ct. 406 (1942). "Mercoid, like Mid-Continent
and Minneapolis-Honeywell, does not sell or install the [patented] Cross heating system.
But the Circuit Court of Appeals found that Mercoid manufactured and sold combustion
stoker switches for use in the Cross combination patent." Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 at 664, 64 S.Ct. 268 (1944).
90 See REPoRT 250, n. 114.
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A suggestion as to a test to be applied in misuse cases may be found
in the committee's discussion of the tying cases where it is suggested
that "the patent may be narrow and unimportant, in which event it
may confer virtually no real market power."' But this is an unreal-
istic approach. The Pipkin patent of General Electric92 and the Gull-
borg patent in Bassick Mfg. Co. v. R. M. Hollingshead Co. 3 were
both "unimportant" because invalid, but by the time this fact had been
finally determined the life of the patents had been spent. Each patent,
though invalid, retained its vitality for over sixteen and three-fourths
of its seventeen-year life.
Also, "market power" is an uncertain factor. An actual or poten-
tial competitor who is bluffed or frightened out of the market on an
invalid or narrow patent, or who is forced out because he cannot af-
ford to litigate, is as effectively eliminated from competition as one
who is compelled to bow to a valid patent. It would be impossible
for a court to learn and evaluate all such factors.
A patent should be evaluated by the criteria set by the patent laws
not by tests contained in other laws designed to treat other conditions.
The antitrust laws regulate "trade" and "commerce" which are
dynamic, ever-changing, elusive concepts. For that reason, the re-
strictions imposed by the antitrust laws are broadly worded. 94 On
the other hand, while technology is also a dynamic, ever-changing
concept, a particular invention is more a static, unchanging thing, and
a patent covering a particular invention should be definite and certain.
The general terms used in the antitrust laws are therefore unsuited
to the type of facts upon which the patent system is based.
b. Contributory Infringement and Patent Misuse
The committee approved section 271 of the 1952 Patent Code and
stated that its provisions "are reasonable expressions of Congressional
intention (a) to codify specifically the remedy of contributory in-
fringement and affirmatively to declare that within the ambit of the
comparatively narrow doctrine so defined the action is itself not a mis-
use; and (b) to cut down the breadth of the all-inclusive applications
of the patent misuse doctrine stemming from the implications of the
Mercoid and other cases." (p. 253)
The fact that some committee members are "unclear" as to the
precise effect of section 271 is not surprising. It certainly does not
9 1R EPoRT 238.
92 See note 83 supra.
3298 U.S. 415, 58 S.Ct. 787 (1936).
94Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 53 S.Ct. 471 (1933).
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overrule the misuse cases, and one commentator, especially familiar
with section 271 summarized: "But when all is said and done the
net effect is simply to add to the law on the interpretation of patents,
with respect to their scope, a statutory provision which renders them
more effective as protection for inventions."95
It has always seemed to the writer that there was no conflict and
only slight if any relationship between the misuse doctrine and the
remedy of contributory infringement. If a patentee is misusing his
patent it makes no difference whether he seeks relief by direct or con-
tributory infringement." If, on the other hand, the patentee is using
the patent properly, relief is available against both direct and con-
tributory infringers. The test is whether the patentee is seeking his
reward within the patent or outside the patent. The misuse doctrine
is concerned only with what the patentee is doing, while contributory
infringement involves only what the alleged infringer is doing. Mis-
use and contributory infringement are completely distinct.
Had American Patents Development Corporation been using the
patented cartons or licensing their use for a fee; had Barber Asphalt
been laying concrete according to the patent or licensing contractors
to do so for a fee; had Mid-Continent or its licensee been installing
patented furnace systems or licensing their installation for a fee; had
Morton Salt or International Salt been engaged in using their inventions
in the canning business or in licensing canners to do so for a fee; then
these companies would have been practicing or licensing the practice
of their patented inventions, and the writer believes that decisions in
the Carbice, Barber Asphalt, Mercoid, Morton Salt and International
Salt cases would have been different whether against a direct or con-
tributory infringer. Instead these companies were using their patents to
monopolize, respectively, "dry ice," bituminous emulsion, switches and
salt, none of which was patented and the Supreme Court found the
patentees' practices unlawful and the patents unenforceable before any
question of contributory infringement was properly reached.
The confusion arises from the fact that in some cases, a patentee
seeking to monopolize unpatented parts has instituted suit for con-
tributory infringement against a competing supplier of the unpatented
95 Rich, "Infringement under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952," 21 Gao. WASH.
L. R v. 521 at 545 (1953).96The American Lecithin cases involved a patent on the use of lecithin to prevent
greying of chocolate and the patentee was seeking to secure a monopoly of lecithin. Re-
lief was denied in an action for contributory infringement [J. C. Ferguson Mfg. Works,
Inc. v. American Lecithin Co., (Ist Cir. 1938) 94 F. (2d) 729, cert. den. 304 U.S. 573,
58 S.Ct. 1042 (1938)], as well as in an action for direct infringement. American Lecithin




parts. Because the remedy sought highlights the patentee's objective
to control unpatented parts, the courts have confused one with the
other. The difficulty with contributory infringement is that too often
a patentee who is using his patent to secure a monopoly of unpatented
parts or supplies uses the contributory infringement remedy against
his competitor in the sale of the unpatented parts or supplies. This
difficulty is not in the remedy of contributory infringement but in
the patentee's practices. As stated by Justice Douglas, "Where there
is a collision between the principle of the Carbice case and the con-
ventional rules governing either direct or contributory infringement,
the former prevails. 97  The misuse question involves only conflict
with the Carbice principle not the form of the remedy which the
patentee seeks. Reference to limiting the doctrine of contributory
infringement and the implication that the residuum left of that doctrine
might be negligible constitute pure dictum since the case was effective-
ly decided on the basis of the patentee's conduct, misuse or unclean
hands, regardless of the nature of the action against the defendant.
c. Patent Misuse as an Antitrust Violation
'We reject the view that any violation of patent law necessari-
ly violates the antitrust laws. From some abuses of patent policy
may flow consequences not drastic enough to meet antitrust pre-
requisites of effect on competition. In addition, many patent
abuses are more effectively curbed by simply denying equitable
relief as a matter of patent policy. Holding every patent law
transgression to be at the same time an antitrust violation would,
moreover, put the patent owner on a different footing than owners
of other property subject to antitrust. For antitrust has its own
measure of permissive and wrongful conduct. To say that action
beyond the borders of the patent grant is a per se antitrust viola-
tion is to ignore the Supreme Court's distinctions between the
variant statutory standards of the Sherman, Federal Trade Com-
mission and Clayton Acts as well as to repudiate the body of in-
terpretations distinguishing between offenses unreasonable per se
and those not." (p. 254)
The courts have never explained the reasons for holding patent
misuse to be a per se violation of the antitrust laws. Two reasons
suggest themselves: (1) the cost and uncertainty of patent litigation
and (2) the monopoly characteristics of a patent.
The cost and uncertainty of patent litigation have been fully dis-
cussed and few other legal instruments of restraint involve the same
97Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 at 669, 64 S.Ct.
268 (1944).
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hazards. For example, if the salt-dispensing machines of International
Salt had been unpatented, leasing the machines at a nominal royalty
on condition that the salt be purchased from International Salt would
have violated the antitrust laws since the Court found that the tests
of the Clayton Act had been met." However, a canner could then
have built or purchased a dispensing machine with no risk beyond
the cost of the machines. When the practice involves patented ma-
chines, the canner would have in addition to the cost of the machine,
the cost of defending an infringement suit and the possibility of
damages and an injunction.
The legal monopoly characteristics of a patent may also be a vital
consideration. A patent is the grant of a monopoly and within the
terms of the grant it is authorized by law and is a lawful monopoly.
Beyond the terms of the grant the patent has no legal basis and the
decisions may mean that monopolization or restraint beyond the grant
is unlawful monopolization or restraint. Further, patent misuse differs
from a non-patent Clayton Act violation in that a patentee can know
with certainty whether or not he is exceeding the terms of his patent
while the Clayton Act may be violated in other ways without knowl-
edge of whether the acts done had the proscribed effect.
Finally, there is some doubt as to the practical existence of a line
between the per se doctrine in patent misuse cases and the test of sub-
stantially lessening competition in the non-patent Clayton Act cases.99
The degree to which commerce must be lessened to violate the Clayton
Act has been shrunk almost to the vanishing point so that the difference
between the per se violation in a patent case and the application of
"statutory standards" in non-patent cases is probably of little more than
academic importance in most instances.
7. Remedies
With respect to the remedies to be provided in antitrust cases in-
volving patents, the Report states:
"A majority of the Committee members deem compulsory
license free of royalties and dedication penal rather than remedial
in character, and hence beyond the Sherman Act's authority to
'prevent and restrain' violations." (p. 256)
98 "... to suBstantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. . . ." 38
Stat. L. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §14.




In this conclusion, compulsory royalty-free licensing, dedication and
injunction against suit are treated as equivalents. Both the majority
and the minority agree that compulsory licensing at reasonable royalty
is a proper remedy when the facts warrant. The majority feel that
"royalty free licensing and dedication differ in kind from divestiture."
(p. 257) But there is no analysis of the differences between patents
as property and other forms of property insofar as it might affect the
two remedies. "Confiscation," "dedication," "cancellation" and "di-
vestiture without compensation" are merdly epithets in the absence of
such analysis.
The objective of the Sherman Act is to "prevent and restrain"
violations 00 but it is also to "effectively pry open to competition a
market that has been closed by defendant's illegal restraints."' 0 ' The
remedy in an antitrust case thus has the dual purpose of terminating
the restraint and establishing or re-establishing competition.
Where physical property is involved and divestiture is decreed, it
is reasonable to assume that the divested property will be used for its
intended purpose. Divested theatres,' 02 for example, would normally
be used as theatres and would compete with the theatres of the former
owner so that competitive conditions would be re-established. Both
the antitrust violator and the new owner would have the facilities to
compete. The fact that the antitrust violator was compensated for
the divested theatre would not directly affect competition in an ad-
verse way.
Because a patent is a mere right to exclude, divestiture is not so
simple. Assume that an antitrust violator was divested of his patent,
that is, the patent was sold to another. Then the purchaser would
be entitled to exclude the violator from the market and the violator
would be eliminated as a competitor. Eliminating any competitor,
even an antitrust violator, is contrary to the policy of the antitrust laws.
The General Electric lamp situation offers an example. The
General Electric tungsten filament incandescent lamp monopoly ante-
dated the Westinghouse agreement of March 1, 1912, and in 1926
that monopoly was held to be a lawful patent monopoly. 103 The same
commercial monopoly continued and in 1949 was held illegal.
04
10026 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §4.
o1 Quoted from International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 at 401, 68
S.Ct. 12 (1947), at p. 354 of the REPoRT.
1
02 Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 68 S.Ct. 947 (1948).
303 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192 (1926).
104 United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 753.
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The decree was not entered until 1953..5 when the monopoly had
been in effect for over forty years. The court was thus faced with
the difficult task of framing a decree to prevent and restrain a mo-
nopoly of unusual age and complexity and to "pry open to competition"
a market which had never been competitive since modem incandescent
lamps were invented. To establish competition it was as important
to preserve General Electric as a competitor as it was to safeguard
other members of the industry and to open the industry to newcomers.
The government proposed two remedies: dedication of patents and
partial divestiture of plant facilities. Had partial divestiture been
granted, General Electric could have used its remaining facilities, and
the purchasers of the divested facilities could have competed with
General Electric, with each other and with others in the industry.
Payment to General Electric for the divested facilities would not have
had an adverse effect on other competitors. The court found divesti-
ture unnecessary and denied that relief but, to eliminate the monopoly
and establish competition, the court ordered dedication of General
Electric's lamp patents.
To have decreed divestiture of patents might have eliminated
General Electric as a competitor and would have rendered useless
General Electric's vast manufacturing facilities. This would have
exceeded partial plant divestiture to an unbelievable degree, assuming
that the General Electric patents are valid. Divestiture of a lamp plant
would not affect General Electric's use and operation of its other lamp
plants while divestiture of valid patents would prevent General Elec-
tric's lamp manufacturing operations entirely.
Production-wise, General Electric had at least 58 percent of the
industry with the economies and other advantages such huge produc-
tion permits. General Electric was permitted to retain these advan-
tages but had it been permitted to charge a royalty on its patents,
other manufacturers in the industry would have been at a cost dis-
advantage equal at least to the amount of the royalty. The benefit
to General Electric of a small royalty from a small manufacturer of
lamps might be negligible but the added royalty burden might make
the small manufacturer unable to compete.
Because of the peculiar nature of patent property, remedies such
as divestiture have an effect quite different from that when other
forms of property are involved, and what would be confiscation or de-
105 United States v. General Electric Co., (N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835.
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struction in the case of tangible property might be the only remedy
which is effective in patent cases to eliminate monopoly and yet leave
the antitrust violator, as well as others, free to compete for the market.
Experience shows that the remedy is one which the courts will grant
sparingly as a last resort and as an alternative to more drastic relief." 6
106 Dedication was denied in such cases as Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,
323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1945); United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., (D.C. Del.
1944) 54 F. Supp. 828; and United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct.
1634 (1947).
